The amount investors can allocate to long-term investing is expected to shrink over time as a result of the economic crisis and increasing regulation putting pressure on companies to act more for short-term profit than invest for the future.
The Switzerland-based non-profit World Economic Forum and consultancy firm Oliver Wyman in their report, The Future of Long-term Investing, said that in 2009 long-term institutional asset owners held $27 trillion, which was less than half of the world’s professionally managed assets of about $65 trillion.
However, these institutional investors, which exclude retail savers and corporate venturing funds but does include defined benefit company pension schemes, have been able to allocate only 25% of their capital to long-term investments, which is defined as money planned to be held over the length of an economic cycle.
In addition to long-term projects, corporations with long-term shareholders are more likely to make significant investments in research and development and other long-term initiatives, the report said. (see below for extract from the report)
The report said: "In our conversations with institutional investors, some participants stressed another particular attribute of long-term investors: the ability to create investments, rather than look for assets in the market and invest in them.
"These investors felt they had the ability to look for unmet economic needs and inject capital to meet those needs; this almost inevitably has a positive social benefit."
But rather than incur the potentially significant fees charged by third-party fund managers, the report said direct investing in entrepreneurs and other alternative assets might be better, if carried out well.
The report said: "There is a powerful motivation for co-investments, based on the substantial fees charged by alternative investment groups. But the anecdotal and academic literature also suggests that this strategy is not a simple one, and investors have often stumbled in their attempt to implement a co-investment strategy."
The problems limiting long-term investing include material short-term financial obligations that must be funded with short-term investments, organisational conservatism and how to manage the people investing the money (called the principal-agency dilemma).
In addition to internal challenges, there are regulatory pressures, such as mark-to market accounting and capital requirements, that can limit the ability to make long-term investments and promote pro-cyclical behaviour on the part of the long-term investors.
These problems mean out of the $27 trillion held by potential long-term investors $6.5 trillion is invested this way, primarily by family offices, endowments and sovereign wealth funds.
Tony Tan Keng-Yam, deputy chairman of the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation and chair of the steering committee for the World Economic Forum’s Long-term Investing project, said: "This report highlights the significant barriers that must be overcome in order to execute an effective long-term investing strategy and the broader economic implications of those constraints."
The report makes six recommendations for long-term investors, regulators and policy-makers:
Policy-makers should consider the unintended impact of regulatory decisions on investor ability to make long-term investments;
Policy-makers should mitigate the impact of capital protectionism on long-term investors;
Long-term investors should develop performance measurement systems that balance fostering a long-term perspective with short-term accountability;
Long-term investors should implement compensation systems that better align stakeholders with the long-term mandate;
Long-term investors should promote among stakeholders a better understanding of the implications of a long-term investing strategy; and
More engaged ownership of public companies by shareholders should be encouraged by policy-makers and long-term investors.
The steering committee behind the report included:
Bader Al Sa’ad, managing director, Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA)
Nicolas Berggruen, president and chairman, Berggruen Holdings
Eric Doppstadt, vice-president and chief investment officer, Ford Foundation
Jack Ehnes, chief executive, California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS)
Joachim Faber, chief executive, Allianz Global Investors
Uwe Feuersenger, chief executive, Aeris Capital, and president of the Family Office Circle
Michael Johnston, executive vice-president (retired), Capital Group Companies
Scott E. Kalb, chief investment officer, Korea Investment Corporation (KIC)
Angelien Kemna, chief investment officer, APG Asset Management
Jim Leech, executive president, Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan
Serge Lepine, chief investment officer, Bahrain Mumtalakat Holding Company
Scott McDonald, managing partner, Oliver Wyman
Adrian Orr, chief executive, New Zealand Superannuation Fund
John Powers, executive president, Stanford Management Company
Augustin de Romanet de Beaune, executive chairman, Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (CDC)
Martin Skancke, director-general, Asset Management Department, Ministry of Finance of Norway
Tony Tan Keng-Yam, (Chair), deputy chairman, Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GIC)
Danny Truell, chief investment officer, The Wellcome Trust
Jacob Wallenberg, chairman, Investor
Extract:
Corporations and their managers often face considerable pressure to fulfil short-term goals. These pressures can encourage productivity and ensure operational efficiency, but sometimes they come at the expense of long-term value creation. Long-term investors can play a role in directing corporate managers to best manage this tension.
The pressure on corporations and their managers to focus on the short term comes from both within the firm and from investors. Managers, for example, may be concerned with producing tangible short-term signs of success. Meanwhile, investors with a short-term perspective will encourage managers to focus on short-term financial indicators-such as quarterly earnings- that tend to drive the stock price up in the near term. This pressure can have significant impact, as shown in a study among 421 financial executives, which found that "firms are willing to sacrifice economic value in order to meet a short-run earnings target…78% of the surveyed executives would give up economic value in exchange for smooth earnings."
However, boosting the short-term market value of the company may be to the detriment of the firm’s longer-term prospects if this focus leads to underinvestment in the maintenance of operating assets, customer loyalty initiatives or employee training.
For instance, take the capital budgeting decisions of a corporation whose stock price is temporarily below its fundamental value. The potential value created from a long-term project will not be fully reflected in the short-term stock price. Short-term investors generally prefer the firm to put such investments on hold and distribute cash. By contrast, long-term investors are more likely to be unconcerned about this temporary mispricing and will be willing to wait until the investment matures or the undervaluation disappears.
This line of reasoning is consistent with empirical research showing that companies with a large share of short-term investors are more inclined to reduce R&D spending to meet short-term earnings goals.
Similarly, empirical research has shown that companies with a large proportion of short-term investors are more likely to receive acquisition bids, and for these bids to exhibit a lower premium on the existing market price for the firm than companies with a larger proportion of long-term investors. This seems to reflect expectations that short-term investors will encourage the firm to agree to the acquisition in order to unlock short-term value, even when this may not reflect the likely value of the firm in the longer term.
Nevertheless, a lack of concern for short-term results and an overemphasis on the long term can likewise be detrimental to an institution. When long-term shareholders do not feel the need to put pressure on investors for short-term results, they may not hold corporations accountable for their actions. Long-term investors therefore can have a positive impact on corporations so long as there is a balance between a focus on long-term value and clear and consistent accountability.